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ABSTRACT
Recent attempts to expand the domain of copyright law in different parts of the world have
necessitated renewed efforts to evaluate the philosophical justifications that are advocated for its existence
as an independent institution. Copyright, conceived of as a proprietary institution, reveals an interesting
philosophical interaction with other libertarian interests, most notably the right to free expression. This
paper seeks to understand the nature of this interaction and the resulting normative decisions. The paper
seeks to analyse copyright law and its recent expansions, specifically from the perspective of the human
rights discourse. It looks at the historical origins of modern Anglo-Saxon copyright law and the theoretical
justifications that are often advocated for its continued existence and expansion. It then analyses how the
proprietary and libertarian interests conflict in the context offour separate settings (a) U.S. Copyright
law and the First Amendment; (b) digital copyright and the emergence of anti-circumvention measures; (c)
copyright expansion in continental European systems and their understanding of expression, and (d) U.K.
copyright law following the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on the same. It also
looks at the argument that since copyright is, in itself an instrument of free expression, a normative
conflict is logically impossible. The paper concludes by identifying strategies for re-postulating the existent
discourse and recognising an increased role for value-based normative hierarchies, adopting a process of
,norm specification' used by courts in dealing with normative decisions during the process of constitutional
interpretation.
INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION AND THE EXPANSION OF PROPRIETARY CONTROL
OVER INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY
The term 'globalization', as used in most current international trade discussions
and debates, would readily fit onto a list of indefinable terms the meanings of which are
better appreciated through perception than through synonymy. A catchword for
proponents of trade expansion and market liberalization, and an intangible adversary for
advocates of a more cautious approach - globalization has become one of the major
determinants of international political relations in recent times. This was, however, not
the case about a decade ago. Even if one concedes that the process of globalization did
commence several centuries ago,' most discussions hardly considered relevant the
practical ramifications of the process, let alone those relating to international relations.
The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 marked the first
creation of a tangible vehicle to accelerate the supposedly pre-existent process of
globalization. 2 Trade expansion and global economic integration remain the central
objectives of the WTO.3
Without answering the controversial question of precisely when globalization
originated, one may nevertheless proceed to understand the features of the world
economy characterized today either as 'globalized' or as witnessing the process of
globalization. Manuel Castells, in his pioneering study of the socio-economic and
political changes introduced by radical technological developments in the late 2 0 th
century, observes that three distinctive features characterize the new global economy.
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The most important of these he identifies is that the economy today is informational -
where productivity and competitiveness have come to depend on the capacity of the
economy to generate, apply and manage efficiently, knowledge based information.5 Thus,
the twentieth century transformation of the global economy from an industrial one to an
informational one is of critical relevance. Probably the most important contributory to
this transformation has been the diffusion of new technologies of communication and the
dissemination of information itself.
6
It would be wrong, however, to equate this transformation with the paradigmatic
shift that occurred from an agricultural economy to an industrial one, in most nation-
states prior to the present shift. The previous transformation witnessed a complete
overhaul in the mode of production. The present shift, however, does little more than
deepen the use of technology within existing modes of production. Industrial
development can hardly be replaced by information - generation. The two need to form a
symbiotic relationship in the new information economy. 7 The widespread diffusion of
new technologies was therefore responsible to a very large extent in the creation of this
new 'globalised, informational' economy.
While Castells no doubt rightly identifies the role of technology in the creation of
the 'information society', another important development that began to accompany this
process was the emergence of strategic control over information. If information and
technology held the key to progress and development, 8 then logically, developing greater
control over the same would ensure the creation and maintenance of a strategic advantage
for individual nations. Thus, with the emergence of the information society, controlling
the use of and access to information and technology became a growing concern. It is
precisely in this context, that the intellectual property system provided the perfect
solution - as a legal means of enhancing control over and access to information.9 This
does not imply that intellectual property, as an institution did not exist. Instead, its use in
the context of multilateral trade assumed for the first time, a manifestly strategic
dimension.
Under the auspices of the WTO, in 1995 the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) was negotiated as one of several mandatory
agreements. Structured in the nature of a minimum standards treaty seeking to harmonize
the scope and extent of global intellectual property protection, the treaty successfully
ensured the introduction of new forms of proprietary control over information and
knowledge that were hitherto considered a part of the public domain in most nations,
specifically the developing world. 10 The inarticulate strategic motive (i.e., information
control) behind the entire treaty was overshadowed by a broader argument for enhanced
proprietary protection to ensure greater scientific and technologic advancement and in the
seemingly obvious advantages of having a harmonized system of intellectual property
protection. Knowledge and information resources, previously considered to be freely
accessible (beyond a minimal level of private control) in a democratic society, were now
commodified through a property-regime, with exclusivity being the characteristic feature
of the new proprietary model.
The TRIPs agreement deals with several forms of intellectual property - with
each having its own immediate and long-term justifications. Among them however, the
law of copyright assumes specific relevance for the purposes of the present paper, in
relation to the right to free expression. Two characteristic features of the law of copyright
deserve special mention here -firstly, being in the nature of a property right over
expression, in the course of its continued expansion, copyright is bound to come into
conflict with the borders of the liberty interest inherent in the very concept of expression;
secondly, more than any other form of intellectual property, the theoretical justifications
offered for copyright law vary from the those that are objectively consequentialist to
those that are abstractly deontological, thereby allowing for a ready comparison with its
libertarian counterpart.
During the course of the present paper, an attempt is made to study copyright law
and its modem expansions using the framework of the human rights discourse. This is
done at two levels. One is in examining whether copyright law and free expression are
capable of a non-confrontational coexistence, given the commonality of subject matter,
i.e., expression. Even if copyright, as it originally existed, did allow for such a balance, is
the same being altogether abandoned by recent attempts to expand copyright law beyond
its original purpose? The second is in examining whether the possibility of a
confrontation ought to be altogether negated, with the understanding that copyright is
itself a means of free expression. Would this then mean that the consequentialist
dimension of expression (property right) and the deontological dimension (free
expression/liberty) are but one and the same? These are some of the issues that are sought
to be brought out in the course of this paper.
Part I of the paper provides a brief overview of the historical origins of modem
Anglo-Saxon copyright law in the context of the printing press in 17 th century England.
The paper then goes on to critically review two important philosophical arguments often
used to justify the existence of copyright law - the Lockean labor argument in the
common law understanding and the Hegelian personality theory, which is often used in
civil law systems. Part II examines the nature of the normative conflict that exists
between the property and liberty interest in relation to copyright and does so using four
specific areas - the U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, recent developments in relation
to digital copyright, the the approach adopted in continental European legal systems and
lastly, the impact of the ECHR on U.K. copyright law. Part III addresses the argument
that copyright law is in itself an embodiment of the right to free expression or an
instrument aimed at furthering the same and that a normative conflict is but a theoretical
possibility. The last part concludes the normative debate, with suggestions for re-
postulating the entire discourse in favour of the libertarian interest.
1. REVISITING THE LAW AND PHILOSOPHY OF COPYRIGHT
Before proceeding to analyze how copyright expansion poses a threat to free
expression, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the law of copyright and identify
specific elements that may be sites for a potential conflict with libertarian values.
Copyright law accords protection, in the form of exclusivity, to any original
expression of an idea."I The idea itself is not protected, only the expression is. 12 The
requirement of originality is not to be confused with the concept of novelty, but merely
means that the work in question must originate from the person claiming to be the author
of the same, though the requirement of originality has been modified, to a limited extent,
to include a 'modicum of creativity' requirement in the United States. 13 In general terms,
copyright law accords the copyright holder the exclusive right to sell, use, distribute, rent
on hire and make copies of the work in question. Being in the nature of a right, it is
assignable and freely transferable, as in the case of most forms of property. The rights
enumerated above, form one component of copyright and are collectively called
'economic rights'. In addition to these, however, copyright law includes a concept called
'moral rights' - which are rights conferred only on authors and are by their very nature
theoretically inalienable. Moral rights consist of the right to be named as the author of the
work and the right to ensure that the work is not mutilated. 14 Most jurisdictions around
the world recognize this classification of copyright. 15
Moral rights, unlike the other elements of copyright, derive intrinsically from the
author and are therefore incapable of transference to another person. They may however
be unilaterally waived or relinquished. 16 This element of copyright law is critical because
it distinguishes copyright from other forms of intellectual property rights by introducing a
large ethical element into the discourse.
Copyright law at its most basic level, in operative terms, confers on a holder the
right to prevent others from performing activities that the holder has an exclusive
prerogative to perform. When others perform such activities, it is termed as
infringement. 17 In addition to identifying the realm of proscribed activities, copyright law
also enumerates certain forms of copying and reproduction, which would theoretically
qualify as infringement, but are in broader public interest, considered permissible. These
activities are collectively referred to as 'fair use' (in the U.S.) or as 'fair dealing'(in the
U.K.), and generally include the use of copyright works for purely personal, non-
commercial or educational purposes.18
While the basic postulates of copyright law and their operation may sound simple,
problems begin to surface when attempting to trace them back to their historical origins
and compare their present day formulations with their contextualised doctrinal geneses.
This inquiry must necessarily begin with the most fundamental question - why
copyright? What necessitated the origins and the continued development of copyright
law? Is the modem law reflective of the same? While the paper deals with the last
question later, it analyzes the others in the present part.
A. The Origins of Modern Copyright
The general law of intellectual property is often traced back to merchant statutes
of Venice, Italy. The modem law of Anglo-Saxon copyright, however, emerged in 16
th
century Britain with the arrival of the printing press. Inter-societal conflict in this time
witnessed the extensive use of the printing press in the distribution of pamphlets and
brochures decrying different governmental activities and calling for uprisings against
authoritarian governance. 19 In this context, a royal charter was passed in 1557, with the
express objective of banning writings of heresy, sedition and treason. This charter is often
considered as the starting point for the modern law of copyright. In purely functional
terms, the charter established the Stationers' Company and granted it the exclusive right
to control all printing. Consequently, as a symbol of regulation and to avoid anonymous
publishing, it became customary for authors and printers to affix their names to works
produced, printed and distributed and to enter their names and works into a register for
the same. This was done, not to give authors due credit, but to monitor their activities.
20
Censorship and trade regulation were therefore inextricably linked together in the
development of the printing press, and were to continue for several decades along these
lines.
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Subsequent to the passage of the charter, the Stationers' Company as a guild grew
to acquire an immense amount of political patronage and economic clout. The exclusive
control given to it to regulate printing had gradually evolved into the equivalent of a royal
prerogative or a monopoly, as a consequence of which it was perceived as controlling the
entire book trade.22 An analysis of the development of the modern law of copyright from
this form of regulation makes for an interesting reading reflecting a confluence of three
values - liberty interests, proprietary concerns and lastly, governmental censorship.
The absolute monopoly granted to the Stationers' Company continued for several
decades all the way up to the Licensing Act of 1662, which made it illegal to publish
anything without first obtaining a license from the appropriate authority. The object of
this regulation was identical to that of the previous enactment. 23 This form of control was
of little controversy until the 1690s, when owing to political factionalism that Britain
witnessed, authoritarian control of the printing press was first considered a distinct
possibility. A realization soon formed that if a partisan or arbitrary regime controlled the
licensing power, printing as a whole would suffer. 24 During this period, a spate of
vehement criticism formed against the existing system of regulation.
John Locke was one of the most vocal of these critics. For purposes of the present
discussion, it is extremely relevant to note that Locke opposed the regulation on the
purported ground that it restricted free speech.25 While it may be debatable whether
Locke was actually concerned with censorship, it is undisputed that Locke was opposed
to the concept of absolute proprietorship over publishing, which he thought was a mere
26pretence for control. Because of these other similar protests, the Licensing Act was
eventually allowed to lapse.
Following the lapse of this Act, a gradual shift took place towards an emphasis on
authorial property. Recognizing that the publishers lobby would again begin a movement
for a new licensing enactment, several authors, who had begun to acquire considerable
political significance in this era, argued for the recognition of a property right in the work
of the author. This argument derived from two premises - one, that unscrupulous
publishers existed who wrongly attributed works to authors or who failed to acknowledge
authors and two, that just as authors could be liable for seditious or treacherous works, so
too were they also to be rewarded for non-seditious works. 27 It is perhaps also important
to note that this era, which had witnessed the Cromwellian Revolution, was driven by the
values of liberty and freedom, and property was ideologically considered an inherent
element in the concept of liberty. Consequently, the need to grant individual authors the
freedom to publish their own works naturally got translated into giving these authors a
proprietary claim in the work - a monopoly that had hitherto been only with the
Stationers' Company.
This resulted in the Statute of Anne in 1709, which recognized a limited copyright
in its emphasis on the concept of authorial copyright. Some writers have argued that the
entire Statute of Anne was merely to reduce the control that existed with the Company.
By introducing a limited copyright, the crown sought to negate any common law
arguments of the Company. More importantly, by introducing authorial copyright, the
Crown was mainly seeking to negate the Company's monopoly under the earlier charter
of 1557, which continued to exist. Therefore, the emphasis was not so much on the grant
of rights to authors as it was purportedly to reduce the control of the Company.
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Subsequent to the passage of the Statute of Anne, a controversy arose. Since the
Statute granted authors copyright protection only for a limited time, many publishers
began to argue that once this period terminated, they were still entitled to additional
protection indefinitely under the common law - which they called the 'common law of
copyright'. The matter eventually reached the House of Lords, which initially ruled that
such a right did exist with authors. 29 In the subsequent decision of Donaldson v.
Beckett3 , however, the House of Lords eventually concluded that the enactment of the
Statute of Anne terminated such protection. Several authors have interpreted the
Donaldson decision to imply a ruling that while such protection did exist in theory under
common law, the passing of the Statute abrogated the same.31 This interpretation implies
that the House of Lords attributed greater control over an authorial work to traditional
copyright. A recent counter interpretation argues that the House of Lords did not support
the existence of a common law of copyright prior to the passage of the Statute of Anne.
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The sequitur of such an interpretation is that the House of Lords did indeed attribute to
copyright law a more public-oriented function, implicitly recognizing that excessive
copyright protection would have deleterious consequences for information dissemination
and was therefore to be restricted.33 In either analysis, however, the debate over copyright
as an element of control remains conspicuously central.
The modern law of copyright, therefore, derives largely from debates on the
necessity of control over information dissemination. In the beginning, control was by the
government in the form of censorship. Later, this control came in the form of a monopoly
with the Stationers' Company. Therefore, copyright, at its roots, has an underlying notion
of control associated with it. Even the purportedly neutral concept of authors' rights, was
evolved, in one analysis, as a counter-control measure.
While control was clearly at the root of copyright debates, property was
seemingly not viewed as a direct form of control.34 Property was considered conceptually
aligned with the values of freedom and liberty and consequently, in this period it was
common to speak in terms of a natural right to property or a freedom to acquire. Control
was viewed as antithetical to liberty. However, at the same time, property, specifically
copyright (as author's rights), seems to have been considered an element of liberty and
not of control, especially in the debates preceding the enactment of the Statute of Anne.
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It is arguable that the House of Lords implicitly abandoned this theory in its Donaldson
ruling of 1774.
Ironically, one sees that limited copyright evolved as a need to reduce the scope
of monopoly control. It emerged as a counter-force to the monopoly of the Stationers'
Company and therefore supposedly representative of the authors' freedom. Reduction of
control was therefore of purported essence in its genesis. The modern trend of further
expanding copyright, which evolved in the context of a need to reduce control, seems to
belittle the purposive foundations of copyright law even though the same may be justified
by the exigencies of modern society. It might even be true that the need to limit copyright
in the public interest was something that the House of Lords implicitly recognized as
early as 1774, but something which seems to have been dogmatically abandoned in recent
times where copyright expansion appears to be the norm.
B. Justifying Copyright law
While copyright law clearly originated in a debate relating to the control of the
printing press, its continued existence has derived from independent philosophical
theorization about the author and his entitlement to a proprietary right in the work he
creates.
The most commonly advocated philosophical justifications for intellectual
property are the Lockean labor theory and the Hegelian personality theory. 36 The
difference between the two theories assumes special significance in the context of the
human rights discourse. Discourses on free trade and economic integration are often
couched in excessively consequentialist language, represented by the simple aphorism
that the 'ends justify the means'. Human rights, on the other hand, are supposed to be
distinctively a-teleological in that they approach the issue from a deontological
perspective, with the means taking precedence over the result.37 Therefore, if a Lockean
approach to copyright were to be adopted by a legal system, the conflict with human
rights relating to expression becomes unavoidable because the Lockean theory would
view copyright as a distinct form of property. On the other hand, were a Hegelian
approach to be adopted in toto, the metaphysical emphases on the actualization of
freedom might eliminate the need to view liberty and property as necessarily opposing
values.
In Locke's theory of property, an individual's expenditure of labor upon
unclaimed common goods entitles him to a right of appropriating the same, so long as the
same is not to the detriment of similar appropriations by others. Put simply, an
individual's expenditure of labor entitles him to a property right over the subject matter in
issue, because the individual, by the exertion, mixes his labor with something and thereby
appropriates it to himself.38 This appropriation, however, is permissible only to the extent
that the residue of the state of nature remains in a condition qualitatively and
quantitatively the same.39 Locke would therefore have assumed that all intellectual
property was a substantive value addition to the existent knowledge and never a reduction
from the same. Additionally, Locke postulated that that appropriation of property must
not result in an accumulation of so much property that some is destroyed without being
used.40 This condition is referred to as the 'non-waste condition'.
The Lockean labor theory thus provides a justification for property premised on
an implicit reference to an incentive/desert mechanism. Since labor is considered an
unpleasant task, a reward worthy of undertaking the same is a property right over the fruit
of the labor.41 The theory is therefore understood as providing the basis for most modem
property theories of desert and rewards. Not surprisingly, intellectual property has often
been considered a similar form of reward - for innovation or creativity. 42 When applied
specifically in the context of copyright, this theory would posit the conferral of a property
right (to the author, in the expression) upon a substantial value addition made by the
author. Copyright law, however, has been toying with the question whether mere labor
(devoid of all qualitative significance) would suffice for protection, or whether some
additional qualitative element is necessary. The issue is yet to be conclusively resolved.43
Nevertheless, the move away from the 'mere labor' standard for copyright in some
jurisdictions may be taken as an indication that copyright law may not be concerned
merely with a desert-based approach after all.
In the event of an overlap between the subject matter of a proprietary claim and a
free speech right, the debate might have to be resolved applying Locke's concept of the
'enough and as good' - the idea of a knowledge commons that cannot be appropriated.
The problem, however, is that Locke appeared to have conceived his idea of the
commons in terms of prior matter inherently capable of proprietary protection. In other
words, the conflict between two or more (existent or potential) proprietary interests
seems to have been Locke's focus rather than a conflict between property and liberty
interests. 44 In this context, Lockean thinking remains ambiguous, as does a large part of
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, in seeking to classify the accumulation of property under the
rubric of a liberty interest itself. If both interests are liberty interests, the assumption of a
mutual co-existence is inherent. The reason for this most likely is that Locke was
specifically seeking to justify the institution of private property as being natural and pre-
societal in origin.45 Consequently, property is seen in terms of a natural freedom to
appropriate.
In an interesting paper, Wendy Gordon argues that an application of the Lockean
theory to intellectual property through the 'no-harm principle' and the 'enough and as
good' condition would ensure that the scope and extent of natural law proprietary
interests are curbed to the extent necessary. 46 She argues that Lockean theory recognizes
the importance of the 'commons' 47 _ the equivalent of the public domain in the context of
intangibles. She also argues that, when coupled with the 'enough and as good' proviso,
the Lockean theory enables other public liberty interests to co-exist with intellectual
property. 48 Essentially, her argument is that the protection of libertarian expressive
interests is built into intellectual property theory, when understood from a Lockean
perspective. Consequently, a true Lockean understanding would enable free speech
interests to operate freely.
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While the Lockean approach is used most often in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence,
the Hegelian understanding predominates in continental legal systems. To Hegel, the will
lies at the core of individual existence, and this will constantly attempts to actualize itself
in the real world.50 Property is considered reflective of this individual personality being
concretized in the actual world. Hegelian theory is premised on the concept of freedom,
not in terms of a libertarian understanding of the concept (in terms of the absence of
control), but, rather, freedom in terms of a metaphysical 'actualization of the human will'
externally. 51 Property allows this to happen through the interaction between human will
and the external world.
From a civil liberties' vantage point, Hegel's theory may provide a strong base to
argue for the continuance of copyright law. Postulated in abstract, metaphysical terms,
the theory comes across as deontological. However, Hegel's theory makes specific
reference to copyright (intellectual property). He argues that intellectual property
(including copyright) can never be alienated in toto, since it is considered a universal
(i.e., intrinsic) part of the individual.52 Only individual things into which the universal is
embodied can be alienated.53
While Hegel premises the inalienability of the universal on his personhood
argument, the reasons Hegel provides to permit the alienability of copies seem to derive
less from the personhood argument than they do from utilitarian considerations - to
promote the progress of the sciences and the arts.54 Consequently, this utilitarian
reasoning seems to have little normative coherence with the personhood argument,
though some authors have sought to link the two together through the concept of
'recognition' .55
Applying the Hegelian theory to modem copyright law raises several intriguing
issues. Apart from the obvious and somewhat important question of whether there is a
critical connection between the subject matter of protection and the personality of the
individual, another important issue which an extrapolation of this theory seeks to ignore,
is that copyright law goes beyond the mere protection of the individual personality. As
discussed earlier, it is only the element of 'moral rights' that accords protection to the
individual's personality for ethical reasons. Consequently, the rest of copyright law,
taking from Hegel's theory, is nothing more than making the individualized personality a
marketable commodity in simple utilitarian terms - something to which Hegel merely
alludes to in passing. If the protection of an individual's representation is considered so
sacrosanct that it should be protected against imitation by another as also from distortion
(i.e., the right to integrity), what then is the personhood rationale for making it a
marketable right? Most rights accruing from copyright are assignable and inherently
market-friendly. 56 Surely a personality-based justification cannot account for this
distinctively consequentialist trait in copyright law.
Foucault makes a similar point, observing that the concept of the 'author', integral
to copyright, is but a discourse attempting to rationalize a process of appropriation that
began several decades ago. 57 He thus alludes to the fact that an argument hinging on
copyright protection as serving the interest of individualized representations is a charade
and a mask for an ulterior commodificatory motive - of making the representation
marketable. An analysis of copyright law as assignable property further substantiates his
point.
A philosophical understanding based on Hegel's theory faces another problem in
that it is constructed on the concept of an individualized autonomous author. The concept
of 'originality' is taken to the extreme, with the assumption that an author works
independent of existent expressions and produces his work from nowhere. 58 This is
certainly not the case from an epistemological perspective - a work can never be totally
independent of other expressions or expressions contained in the public domain. If this is
the case, the work cannot be individualized to the author in toto. What then is the
personality rationale for protection? Again, Hegel seems to make indirect reference to
this point, observing that the true extent to which a person makes something his property
through the reproduction of another's intellectual products cannot be precisely
determined. 59
Therefore, a personality-based deontological justification for the entirety of
modern copyright law is inadequate. In an interesting analysis of Hegelian property
theory applied to intellectual property, Jeanne Schroeder concludes that the Hegelian
theory may be more utilitarian and pragmatic than it is originally believed to have been.
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She goes on to conclude that the romanticism associated with the traditional Hegelian
understanding is completely misplaced and that it is a misreading of the theory to use it in
justifications for continental moral rights. In this analysis, while Hegel did believe that
property was necessary for personhood, he was not concerned with the content of the
property regime, or its origins. To him, property was justifiable only because of its role in
society and not on the basis of any independent natural or metaphysical reason. This
analysis, in its rejection of the Hegelian theory to justify the substantive content of
personality-based intellectual property rights (i.e., as emanating from the connection
between the work and the personality of the creator) only substantiates the general
inadequacy of the Hegelian theory to provide a comprehensive philosophical argument
that explains copyright law.
Thus, a consequentialist, market-based approach takes precedence in most cases -
but for the small element of moral rights. If the market-based approach is self-sufficient-
why then is the deontological element (i.e., moral rights) still retained? The answer may
lie in the use of the deontological element of copyright, where the author needs to protect
his individual creation from misappropriation or distortion as a justification for the
continued expansion of copyright law, even though the market-driven, consequentialist
side is benefiting from the same.
Modem copyright law, therefore, has little deontological legitimacy. While the
'author' initially was projected as the party seeking protection for his personalized
creativity, even this has been abandoned in most jurisdictions today, with the emphasis
having shifted to protecting the financial investments of those involved in the creation,
regardless of their creative contribution (e.g., copyright protection for databases in
Europe). Copyright law is and has been a creation of the market, an attempt to
commodify creativity - a process that begun subtly with the emergence of the printing
press, but that has turned into an openly restrictive framework. While this may not be
objectionable per se, it is bound to have repercussions for innumerable democratic
institutions.
Many recent developments seem to call into question the suitability of these
theoretical approaches to understanding the philosophical basis for copyright law. More
recently, some have sought to argue that the Lockean natural rights approach does little
more than make a case for limited proprietary protection and that the deontological
approach (i.e., a personality justification) has little normative representation in modern
copyright law besides moral rights.61 These approaches locate the philosophical
legitimacy of copyright law in incentive mechanisms, supported by broader public benefit
arguments. 62 While one may apply these approaches with ease within a specific
constitutional framework (such as that of the United States, given the language of Article
I, Clause 8), the question remains whether the same is applicable to the entirety of
modern copyright law, given its transnational and multi-cultural genealogy.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTOURS OF THE NORMATIVE CONFLICT
Having traced the origins of modem copyright law and its inherent element of
control, and having analyzed the various philosophical debates about copyright law's
existence, we next examine the nature and extent of the conflict between libertarian and
proprietary interests in relation to 'expression', the subject matter of copyright law.
A. 'Expression': The site of conflict
The concept of expression forms the subject matter of protection under copyright
law as well as free speech laws. Therefore, it is imperative, at the outset, to understand
the scope of the term, assuming such delimitation to be possible.
Etymologically, 'expression' represents any verbal or non-verbal communication
that purports to represent any internal emotion.63 This understanding is wide and does
represent, in theory, the full range of human communication. Nevertheless, is the same
meaning intended in human rights and copyright discourses?
In the context of human rights discourses, expression is generally given an
extremely wide meaning. A right to expression (often clubbed with the right to free
opinion) includes not only outward communication, but also communications from
others. The UDHR,64 the ICCPR65 and other related conventions adopt a similar
understanding. The right to free speech is often used in conjunction with the right to
expression and is sometimes said to be a sub-set of free expression. Any form of
66communication, therefore, regardless of its substantive quality , is accorded protection
under the right to free expression. The width of the concept is best illustrated by the
interpretation that the right to expression includes the right to non-expression, i.e., the
right to remain incommunicado.
Copyright law understands the concept of 'expression' as a counter-position to the
concept of the intangible idea. The concept derives from the infamous idea-expression
dichotomy, considered to be central to copyright law.67 Two limitations, however, restrict
the scope of expression in copyright law. First is the requirement that only the expression
to the exclusion of the idea can be protected. Thus, if the idea and expression merged,
such as where an idea is capable only of one form of expression, no copyright protection
would be available. 68 This is not so regarding free expression, where ideas themselves
can form a part of the protected expression. 69 Secondly, copyright protection is only
available (in most jurisdictions) to expressions that can be fixed.70 This fixation
requirement derives from the idea of reproducibility inherent in copyright law. Thus,
mere utterances or speeches would not be protectable expressions unless reduced (or
inherently capable of being reduced) to written form or recorded using other means. Once
so reduced, it is the reproducible form that is protected, which is contrary to free
expression rights, where reproducibility has little relevance. These limitations on the
meaning of expression in copyright law derive from the purpose and function of
copyright law as such.
All forms of expression covered by copyright law would thus find coverage under
the right to free expression, while the converse need not necessarily hold true. As
understood in human rights discourses, the concept of expression is expansive and seeks
to cover as many forms as possible. By contrast, in copyright law, it is understood in the
sense of a counter-position to the notion of the intangible, ephemeral idea.
B. Instances of the confrontation
This part briefly examines four different areas where the liberty-property conflict
is best seen in relation to copyright law. It is important to note at the outset that the
approach adopted in seeking to balance these interests has varied in all of these cases,
reflecting the lack of a singular solution to the problem.
1. United States copyri2ht law and the First Amendment
The conflict between copyright law and free expression is especially relevant in
the United States and has existed for several decades. This special significance exists
because both copyright law and free expression derive from the Constitution. Both seek
to promote values recognized asfundamental in the United States polity. Article I, Clause
871 speaks of copyright law, while the First Amendment guarantees the right to free
expression. 72 Therefore, arguments that constitutional supremacy provides the balance
are of little relevance, 73 reducing the conflict to one between two constitutional
directives. The critical distinction remains, however, that while one is positive, by
enabling legislation on a subject (i.e., copyright), the other, by its very nature, restricts
that enabling power.
Another significant feature of the U.S. model is that it clearly delineates the
purpose of copyright, albeit in teleological terms, as lying in the promotion of science and
arts. No covert attempt is made to disguise copyright extension in terms of deontological
personality assumptions discussed earlier. Over the years, courts have faced the
implications of the conflict on many occasions and have developed certain techniques in
dealing with them. These techniques may be classified into three categories.74 The
remainder of this section will attempt to analyze these techniques. Not all cases on the
point are presented here, 75 but a representative selection is used to illustrate the different
approaches.
At the very outset, it is important to remember that the First Amendment, on
numerous occasions, has been accorded an expansive interpretation by the U.S.
judiciary. 76 The approach has been one of understanding liberty as both an end as well as
a means. Free speech and expression were considered the cornerstone of the American
democratic set-up and, therefore, courts went out of their way to guard that right.77 This
has led several scholars to argue that the primacy accorded to the First Amendment ought
to imply the impossibility of a normative conflict, since the First Amendment would
always triumph if one were to ever arise and consequently, to argue that the real issue lies
in the courts' reluctance to recognize the very existence of a conflict.
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In the first category of approaches adopted by courts, emphasis was placed on the
idea-expression dichotomy. Whenever the possibility of a conflict between a copyright
interest and a First Amendment interest arose, courts immediately invoked the dichotomy
to argue that expression was the subject matter of copyright, while the First Amendment
was aimed only at protecting "...a free marketplace of ideas Consequently, no
conflict existed because copyright law could never cover ideas.
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corporation, 80
the defendant's advertisements featured a 'McDonaldland' with characters and figures
therein. The plaintiff had developed a television series called 'Pufnsuf', which had near
identical characters and names. When the court found that the defendant had copied from
the plaintiff, the defendant immediately sought to invoke the First Amendment's right to
free expression. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the idea-expression
dichotomy necessitated treating copyright expression and First Amendment protected
ideas separately. Therefore, the court ruled out the very possibility of a conflict.8 The
court later used near identical reasoning in Harper & Row Publishers v. National
Enterprises. 
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This reasoning seeks to avoid the issue altogether and is, in that sense,
commendable. However, it ignores the fact that while the First Amendment may protect
ideas, it is not restricted to ideas alone. If an idea and an expression overlap, both lie
protected under the First Amendment. In such a case, the conflict becomes very clear and
courts will have to make a value-based decision. Further, the reasoning also ignores
situations where an idea may only be capable of a singular expression.83 In such a case,
the conflict cannot be avoided by resort to the idea-expression dichotomy and would call
into application the 'doctrine of merger', discussed earlier.
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The second approach involves the court's use of the 'fair use' doctrine. As
mentioned earlier, this doctrine serves as a defence by making certain blatant acts of
infringement non-actionable. It remains debatable whether fair use can be legitimately
considered an element of free expression. Since, in its nature, 'fair use' is not an enabling
right, but rather a defensive one, authors have tended to disagree on this point.8" While
courts are yet to decide this point, they still seek to avoid resorting to the First
Amendment per se by invoking the fair use doctrine.
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What is of interest here, however, is that in applying the fair use doctrine, courts
have sought to introduce an element of 'public interest' clearly not expressly mandated
under the traditionally understood requirements of fair use. 87 Though not decisive, courts
have used the existence of this element to buttress their arguments and in ruling against
infringement in numerous cases. Thus, in Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, 88 the
court applied the doctrine of fair use and additionally found that public interest favoured
allowing the defendant to disseminate the copyrighted information of the plaintiff, since
it involved the biographical details of an eminent individual and in New York Times v.
Roxbury Data Interface, 8 9 it allowed the extraction of names from an index because the
new index being made by the defendant would serve the public interest in disseminating
the information. The most important of these cases is that of Times, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Associates.9" This case related to photographs taken of the Kennedy assassination,
copyright over which was vested with the plaintiff. The Warren Commission extensively
used these photographs to make its findings on the assassination. When the defendant
sought to reproduce these photographs in his report seeking to disprove the findings of
the Commission, the plaintiffs brought an action for infringement. In finding for the
defendant, the court held that "...there was a public interest in having the fullest
information available on the murder of President Kennedy.91" In all these cases, the court
refused to expressly rule on the applicability of the First Amendment guarantee to the
issue involved.
The third approach is a slight modification of the second, and has primarily been
the subject of academic thinking. It involves the recognition of an independent first
amendment exception to infringement, independent of the fair use doctrine, but
applicable only in cases of public interest. The fair use exception, being an intrinsic
defense, cannot exist independent of copyright law. The first amendment defense would,
according to this argument, have an independent existence and therefore be of greater
legitimacy.
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The second and third approaches discussed above may prove to be acceptable
solutions assuming an important caveat is recognized in their application. This caveat
allows the 'public interest' determinant to serve only to evaluate the circumstances
justifying the normative precedence of free speech interests, vis-A-vis copyright law, and
not to subjectively determine the qualitative public interest impact, which a specific
expression has in the circumstances of the case. Adopting the latter approach means that
if an expression had little political (and therefore public) utility, it would risk not
qualifying for protection under these public interest approaches. Such an approach is
clearly inconsistent with the wide understanding of expression in the liberty discourse.
The issue may ultimately be viewed as one of adequate generality in the discourse. Thus,
while it may be appropriate to argue normatively that public interest necessitates
permitting the dissemination (through copying) of information relating to public health
issues, it would be a qualitative determination to argue that the nature of information
present in the expression renders it in public interest to allow its free dissemination (and
copying). The former would be a normative determination coupled with a specific
reference area (public health, in the illustration) in which the normative preference would
operate. The subjective determination, if any, is restricted to a determination of whether
one can categorize the expression as falling within the reference area identified, which is
dependent on how widely or narrowly it is defined. The latter, however, is a subjective
determination without a normative reference area, requiring a qualitative assessment of
the content of the expression itself by reference to an indeterminate principle.
Robert Denicola, in arguing for the introduction of an independent first
amendment privilege to copyright infringement, states that such a qualitative 'public
interest' determination is inevitable, given the case-by-case assessments that are involved
and the ephemeral distinctions that copyright law entails. 93 However, there appear to be
judicial pronouncements where courts have used 'public interest' more as a normative
determination rather than as a qualitative one - though not in express terms.
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It may be important to pause here and understand the significance of the
distinction between the two methods discussed above. The distinction may be likened to
the process of 'constitutional specification' that some proponents of the original intent
school of constitutional interpretation advocate. Michael Perry, in his discussion of
original intent, argues that the process of constitutional specification is between the
processes of constitutional interpretation, which involves the isolation of the norm in
question, often indeterminate, and the actual application of the norm to the facts before
the court. 95 The process of specification according to Perry is a normative inquiry, which
involves determining the contextualized meaning of a norm in a given situation.96 Thus, it
is the process of determining the amplitude of a constitutional norm within a given
factual context, thereby ridding it of its abstract nature and filling it with a specific
policy-based normative preference. 97 This is to be distinguished from the process of
application, which is a purely deductive process and involves no appeal to normative
preferences.
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The process, as noted earlier, is one of reducing the generality of the norm by
coloring it with a contextual significance. Thus, to say free speech interests must
ordinarily prevail when they conflict with copyright would be, in a sense, indeterminate
to a context. To further specify it, by what may be called ascribing to it a 'reference area'
clothes it with contextual meaning whereby it gets translated into - in the context of
public health issues, free speech interests must always prevail over copyright claims
(with the reference area being expressions in the area of public health). The last process
involves one of actually applying the contextualized norm by determining whether the
expression involved is one relating to a public health issue. Therefore, the court's
subjective determination of the expression's qualitative nature is limited to within the
identified reference area.
The significance of this discussion is critical to the operation of a full liberty
interest and is discussed again in the context of U.K. developments, where courts seem to
have adopted a similar process.
All the approaches of the courts thus far indicate a general reluctance to tackle the
issue head-on, possibly reflecting the perceived inadequacy of any solution. The fair use
determination, at the end of the day, would be a factually dictated one, while one based
on the First Amendment would be policy related, necessitating a pronouncement by the
court on the relative importance of the two conflicting values, within an identified
reference area.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently had to make this very determination once again
in Eldred v. Ashcroft.99 This case involved a constitutional challenge to the Copyright
Term Extension Act, which extended the term of copyright protection retrospectively by
twenty years. Accordingly, works that had already fallen into the public domain would
now be entitled to an additional period of protection. This was challenged as both
violative of Article I, clause 8, and of the First Amendment. The court, with a seven-
judge majority, found the statute to be intra vires the First Amendment. The court
recognized that while copyright per se was not immune to First Amendment limitations,
traditional copyright was provided with many limitations and safeguards, taking it
outside the scope of free expression.100
The Court seems to acknowledge that while the values could conflict in theory,
they were incapable of doing so in practice. The inherent limitations in copyright doctrine
rendered such a conflict impossible. Does this render these inherent limitations more as
elements of free expression than parts of copyright law? The court once again adopted the
strategy of avoiding the issue. The crucial issue, however, in terms of the rights
discourse, is the effect of a proposition that, on the one hand, reaffirms the supremacy of
a normative value but at the same time, refuses to apply it in a concrete situation. Given
its emphasis on the means, it appears that such an approach would nevertheless fall
within the accepted parameters of the rights discourse.
101
The American approach, therefore, represents a judicial approach seeking to
favour market-driven copyright, with the understanding that the incursions, if any, into
free expression are minimal and therefore capable of being ignored. If nothing else, the
readiness of the courts and the constitutional set-up to recognize this is commendable.
Even though much has been written and theorized about the conflict in the American
constitutional set-up, 10 2 the judiciary has been reluctant to recognize the conflict in
normatively concrete terms. The judiciary, however, has exhibited a progress from the
earlier approaches to ruling that a conflict may be theoretically possible at best. This is
indeed a positive advancement along the spectrum of avoidance.
This avoidance approach has been the subject of some harsh criticism in recent
times. Neil Weinstock Netanel, has convincingly argued that this anomaly is a result of
an antiquated understanding of the courts, deriving from notions of copyright as they
stood prior to the recent spate of expansionist trends. 0 3 He further explains how
copyright is effectively 'content-neutral' regulation, subject to a rigorous and exacting
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, in spite of its being characterized as a
regulation that purports to further free speech interests. 10 4 It is heartening to see the
recognition that the avoidance approach of the U.S. courts and their subtle doctrinal
loopholes are insufficient to immunize copyright from First Amendment challenges.
2. Digital Copyright & Anti-circumvention Provisions
With the emergence of the 'information age' and the extended use of the Internet
for communication, copyright's traditional form of control through restrictions on the
physical medium came to be gradually eroded, necessitating an overhaul of copyright
law. Through the use of freely available technology over the Internet, copies could be
made of works and distributed ad infinitum at absolutely no expense at all. Not only
could such occurrences not be controlled technologically, but they also could not be
readily detected either.
This necessitated the introduction of new forms of control into copyright law. The
foremost of these were provisions aimed at curbing the circumvention of technological
measures 1 5 . To prevent multiple copying of software and digital media, companies
developed technological safeguard measures that locked the code inherent in the software
or medium in question. This locking ensured that only the original owner could use the
software in conjunction with the medium of purchase. 106 To break these locks,
individuals soon began to create various programs and devices, which they freely
distributed. The introduction of anti-circumvention provisions into copyright law
effectively curbed this and rendered the distribution or creation of software/devices
meant to unlock technological anti-copying mechanisms, itself a form of proscribed
conduct.1
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As many scholars have observed, the development of the Internet as a global
communication medium was primarily because it served as a medium for the free
exchange of information and software between individuals. If this came to be regulated -
either technologically or legally, then the very basis on which the Internet evolved, i.e.,
freedom would cease to exist and with it, eventually the Internet as we know today.1
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Measures such as technological anti-copying mechanisms, ensure that both non-
legitimate and legitimate reproducutions (i.e., fair use copies) of a copyrighted expression
(i.e, software) are effectively forbidden. If fair use is indeed an element of free
expression, as debated previously, then the conflict is but obvious. Can an argument be
made that technological control is a restriction on free expression? Even if this argument
is implausible, the second limb is surely possible - that penalizing circumventions
regardless of the use is an infraction of the right. Anti-circumvention provisions have the
effect of further legitimizing technological anti-copying systems by rendering conduct
directed to disabling the technology illegal.
This was precisely the point in Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes. 109 Here, the
court considered the validity of the anti-circumvention measures of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 11 in light of the right to free speech and expression
under the First Amendment. The argument was advanced at two levels. The defendant
first argued that software code was speech and therefore that the anti-circumvention
measure proscribing it was invalid as an unjustifiable restriction on the right. Next, the
defendant argued that even if otherwise permissible, by failing to draw a distinction
between legitimate and illegal uses of the code, the anti-circumvention provision
curtailed fair use, an integral element of free speech. While both these arguments were
rejected, the reasoning of the court is of relevance.
While the court readily recognized that code was capable of being an expression
protectable under the First Amendment, it went on to observe that since this expression
(i.e., software code) had a functional relevance, courts should treat it differently under the
First Amendment. The court held that code was speech-conduct as an independent
category."' Therefore, conduct, being a functional element, was incapable of being
categorized as expression. The sequitur of this classification was that the court now could
adopt a differential standard for review of the provision's constitutionality. The court
then observed that though the code (i.e., the DeCSS code) was essentially speech, it had a
certain effect when functional, which could be illegitimate, and hence was entitled to a
differential treatment.
Should the contextualised effect of an expression, make it less worthy of
libertarian protection? Not only does the expression in question have a specific effect
only in a specific context (i.e., when fed into a computer); even in this context, it is only
within a further sub-category of cases that the expression has an impermissible
consequence. The code is capable of being used for permissible fair use purposes, thereby
reducing the probability that the speech (i.e., code) will produce an impermissible result.
The court completely avoided the issue of constitutional protection for the fair use
doctrine and refused to provide an answer, finding that the Constitution nowhere
guaranteed copying the original work in its original format. 112 Consequently, the court
rejected the fair use argument as well.
The implications of anti-circumvention provisions for fair use merit some
analysis. In its simplest form, fair use refers to certain activities, which though ordinarily
the exclusive prerogative of the copyright holder to perform, are nevertheless permitted
to be performed by others as well under certain specific circumstances. 113 It, therefore,
refers to a form of conduct and embodies a certain libertarian element, thereby
undeniably forming a part of the right to free expression. Though anti-circumvention
laws (forming a part of copyright law) expressly provide that the fair use right will
remain intact in its original form, this actually seems to be mere lip service. Courts, in
interpreting these provisions, have concluded that the reference to fair use is restricted to
traditional copyright fair uses alone and not to actions based on anti-circumvention
provisions. 114 Thus, if an anti-circumvention provision were violated for the purpose of
accesing information protected therein, for purely educational purposes (which would
qualify as fair use) - the act would still constitute a violation of the provision, with the
actual purpose being of little relevance to the inquiry. Anti-circumvention provisions
have therefore effectively restricted the scope of fair use and thereby impinged upon the
right to free expression. This has resulted in some authors calling for the invocation of an
independent and general legitimate use defense specific to anti-circumvention law.
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As noted earlier, expression in its widest sense is taken to cover accessing
information as well, in addition to its dissemination. It thus becomes crucial to
distinguish between copy control and access control technologies of protection. While the
former merely seeks to restrict the copying of information, the latter seeks to restrict the
copying of information by controlling access to the information to begin with. This raises
the issue of whether access control technologies can protect works that cannot be the
legitimate subject matter of copyright protection and thereby regulate conduct that has no
connection with copyright law. In the tangible world - access control does exist over the
medium of dissemination, but is never the subject matter of copyright law. The analogy
would be to having a book with a key-lock and bringing the act of picking the lock under
copyright law with the tenuous reasoning that by protecting the lock device, one is
indirectly preventing the copying of the book. This would restrict access to the
information in toto - regardless of whether the work is sought to be copied. The issue of
whether access control can be the subject matter of copyright law (even if copy control
can, since it has some connection with copyright) is one that has not received sufficient
philosophical attention - specifically since such access control would constitute a direct
incursion of the right to free expression, understood in its widest sense.
This issue was addressed in the context of the anti-circumvention provisions of
the Australian Copyright Act, 19681 16. There, the argument was advanced that access
control provisions had no link with copyright law and that they would further restrict
access to works existing in the public domain.117 In spite of this, the Australian approach
sought to balance the two such that the existent definition of the term 'effective
technological protection measure' is a hybrid of both access and copy control."i8
The expansion of digital copyright under the rubric of anti-circumvention law
clearly evinces a distinctly teleological approach to copyright law. The end sought to be
regulated, reduction of copying, seems to take precedence over all other values, including
free expression. In the process, copyright law is expanded to the extent that it no longer
becomes an anti-copying form of control, but one that actually restrains everyday human
conduct. Clearly such regulation falls foul of any interpretation placed on a free
expression doctrine. In this arena, it undoubtedly remains that proprietary interests reign
supreme.
A broader issue raised by the entire digital copyright debate remains whether, in
the context of the Internet, a new free expression standard ought to be developed since
the Internet has traditionally been considered the bastion of free expression and liberty.119
Already, there exists literature stating that traditional notions of intellectual property may
need modification to suit the nature of creativity on the Internet. 12 This may also be
equally applicable in the context of free expression. One can argue that the very
architecture of the Internet promotes a culture of free exchange of ideas and information,
making it inherently the subject matter of a libertarian free expression interest. It may be
that this standard is too high. Nevertheless, for the time being, it is clear that liberty
interests come second to copyright concerns over the Internet in spite of there being a
considerable amount of criticism leveled against this form of copyright expansion. 121 This
probably reflects an ancient tradition that began with the Statute of Anne - new
technologies fostering new forms of control.
3. Copyright & Free Expression in Continental Europe
The overlap between copyright law and free expression in Europe is interesting,
primarily because copyright in continental Europe has traditionally been premised on a
deontological understanding of the work, representing the individual personality of the
author (termed as droit d'auteur). 122 This is unlike the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. 1
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Copyright law in the continental system (specifically, France and Germany)
developed along lines similar to the common law system. Here too, it originated in a
system of privileges, aimed primarily at censorship and control, rather than in granting
exclusive monopoly rights. 124 These printing privileges were renewed from time to time.
Eventually, however, a conflict arose between metropolitan printers (mainly the Parisian
ones) and those in outlying provinces, with the latter arguing that the privilege system
unfairly favored the metropolitan printers over others. In this context, the Parisian
printers (i.e., metropolitan printers) sought to argue that the privilege system merely
recognized the pre-existent, natural property of authors, in an attempt to safeguard their
own interests. 125 The provincial printers, in contrast, argued against all forms of control,
stating that ideas were never created as such and consequently that any monopoly right
had to be limited in scope and duration.
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The law eventually sought to balance both these arguments by recognizing
authorial property for a limited duration and then allowing the property to pass into the
public domain. 127 In the entire debate surrounding authorial property, the concept of the
droit d'auteur (based on authorial personality) was not the exclusive philosophical reason
for the emergence of the right. Similar to the common law, the primary concern of the
system apparently lay in safeguarding exploitation rights and curbing piracy. 128 The
copyright discourse here assumed a moralistic plane only much later, in an effort to
accommodate judicial pronouncements and the political exigencies of the period.
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Legislatures finally recognized this development statutorily in the mid-twentieth century.
According to one school of thought, however, this recognition was based on a misreading
of prior texts rather than a reflection of the prevalent copyright philosophy.13
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A critical distinction observed between the two systems, is that while in the
Anglo-Saxon approach, copyright is narrowly defined with its various limitations
accorded an expansive approach, in the continental approach the copyright is as a natural
right very widely understood, with very limited exceptions. 131 The reason for this rather
late recognition in continental Europe of the need for exceptions may lie in the varied
concepts of freedom and liberty held in many of these nations, which still espouse a
doctrine of copyright constructed around the romantic concept of the author and original
genius.
In a sense, therefore, the deontological element theoretically informs the entire
copyright discourse. In many jurisdictions, the absence of a fair use defense can be
attributed to the simple understanding (rightly or wrongly) that copyright deals primarily
with the need to safeguard authors against misuses of their works, which would amount
to distortions of their individual personalities as embodied in the expression. Fair use has
always been concerned with the need to show absence of commercial motive. From a
purely deontological reading, however, this is irrelevant since the commercial/non-
commercial distinction is of little relevance in protecting the personality of the author.
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The practicalities of globalization have in recent times forced the harmonization of
copyright laws in Europe and across the world, resulting in this abjectly deontological
nature of continental copyright law being diluted with distinctively commercialistic,
consequentialist notions.
Given this deontological inclination, and assuming that a court is ready to assume
the existence of a conflict, how would a solution present itself?. This discussion assumes
importance for the first time, in light of Article 10 of the ECHR,133 which provides a
codification of basic human rights against which courts can review domestic legislation
and actions. While the initial phase saw a general reluctance among courts to recognize
the very possibility of such a conflict, the next important trend that one is able to discern
is a readiness among courts to allow a free speech/expression defence if the expression is
political or has significant public interest involved 134 This would amount to no more
than the qualitative assessment discussed earlier, which requires courts to examine the
importance of the individual expression in question but not necessarily along normative
lines. Nevertheless, this should be avoided to retain the intended width of protection
under Article 10. The public interest test, on the other hand, should be in the nature of a
normative process determination - as discussed earlier. Thus, an artistic expression with
little public policy significance might be allowed such libertarian protection if the public
utility/interest served in allowing artistic expressions is considered greater than that of
restricting the same, within the reference area in question. This seems to be the initial
approach adopted in one French case, 135 where the court allowed the picturization of
artistic collections under the rubric of free expression, arguing that the right of the public
to be informed of important cultural events would prevail over copyright interests in the
artistic work itself.136 This represented a distinctively utilitarian approach to the entire
conflict issue, and seems primafacie representative of the process identified earlier- the
identification and application of a reference area (important cultural events) to the case at
hand (i.e., the identification of an open-ended norm, which is further contextualized and
then specifically applied)
On appeal however, the decision of the court along the 'public interest' lines was
expressly rejected by the Court of Appeals. The case was that Jean Fabris v. Stj France
2, 137 where a broadcaster had made and broadcast a news report about an exhibition of
paintings. Copyright in the paintings vested in the estate of the artist, which claimed that
the act constituted copyright infringement. The broadcasters sought to place reliance on
Article 10 of the ECHR, arguing that the rights of freedom of expression and the right of
the public to information necessitated the infringement. The lower court found in favour
of the defendants, making the observations noted above in what seems to be an adoption
of the normative reference area approach. 138 The Paris Court of Appeals however, in
reversing the decision of the lower court, refused to recognize the existence of this
independent defence, on the premise that copyright law has sufficient in-built safeguards
which ensured that it did not transgress free expression interests.
The decision of the Paris Court of Appeals in essence is the approach initially
adopted by courts in the United States, where they sought to accommodate the normative
conflict through the internal doctrines of copyright law. It may well be that this is
representative of an underlying recognition by the courts of the distinctively
consequentialist flavour that copyright law has come to acquire in recent times.
The dearth of sufficient case law in Europe relating to these issues allows only for
a minimal amount of theorization about what the approach of the courts will be in the
days to come. However, judging from recent trends and the specific philosophical
foundations from which the law of copyright derives, it is highly likely that with national
courts in jurisdictions where copyright derives from the moralistic plane, the droit
d'auteur will take precedence over the right to free expression. However, some scholars
do believe that with the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights,
specifically to ensure enforcement of the ECHR - this attitude will change to one in favor
of the libertarian interests. 139 This would indeed be an illustration of the supra-national
enforcement of human rights taking primacy over the international harmonization of
copyright laws within Europe. Only time however, will determine whether this will
indeed occur or not.
4. U.K. Copyright Law and Article 10 of the ECHR: Norm
Specification
In the United Kingdom, the absence of a written constitution and a bill of rights
has meant that the development and protection of basic liberties emerged through the
judicial process. As a result, the U.K. lacked any constitutional procedure, or
procedurally equivalent process, for the judicial review of legislative action as existent in
other democracies that operate under a written constitution. With its accession to the
ECHR, the U.K. enacted the Human Rights Act in 1998140 specifically mandating that
courts interpret domestic legislation in accordance with the rights enshrined in the
ECHR 141 and make a declaration of incompatibility in the event of a conflict. 142 Such a
declaration, however, has no bearing on the validity of the enactment (in the sense that a
procedure of judicial review ordinarily would) and is thus different from the traditional
process of judicial review, which enables a court to declare a law invalid for non-
compliance with constitutional directives. 143 Nevertheless, the limited review process has
ensured that, in interpreting existent legislative provisions, courts give due consideration
to important libertarian interests, including the right to free expression.
In the U.K., copyright law is governed by the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act
of 1988.144 The CDPA recognizes copyright both in economic and moral terms, with the
former being dominant. The moral rights recognized, though extensive, nevertheless can
be waived or infringed with the consent of the author in question. 14 Relevant to our
present discussion, however, is a provision contained in Section 171(3) of the CDPA,
which provides that courts may prevent or restrict the enforcement of copyright for public
interest or other reasons. 146 The question, therefore, is whether the right to free expression
constitutes a public interest reason for restricting copyright protection under this
provision, especially since the right is now mentioned in U.K. legislation under the
Human Rights Act. 147
The Court of Appeals was called upon to make this determination in Ashdown v.
Telegraph Group Ltd.14 8 This case involved the report of a confidential political meeting,
prepared by the plaintiff using his personal diaries. The confidential report was leaked to
the defendants who then carried news stories on the report, quoting verbatim from parts
of the report. The plaintiff, thereafter, claimed copyright infringement and breach of
confidence. In response, the defendant argued that since Article 10 of the ECHR was now
a part of U.K. law, it necessitated an examination of whether the copyright protection in
the instant case was violative of the right to free expression enshrined therein. The lower
court rejected this argument and the matter was appealled. 1
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On appeal, the court, for the first time, concluded that circumstances could arise
where copyright law conflicted with free expression interests and that in such cases, the
need to balance the two interests, could lead to the right to free expression trumping
copyright interests.150 The court, however, eventually ruled that the defendant's excessive
reproduction of the plaintiffs language was not necessary in the interests of accuracy (a
public interest reason), and was used to "...add flavour to the article." Therefore, the
defendant was not entitled to libertarian protection at the cost of the plaintiff s proprietary
interest. 151
While the eventual decision did favor the proprietary interest over the libertarian
one, the case is of importance to our analysis primarily from a methodological
perspective. Recalling the distinction drawn earlier between the court's role in evaluating
the subjective element of the expression and in deciding the issue from a normative basis,
where would the approach of the Court of Appeals in the Ashdown case fall?
It would appear that the court did not interpret the 'public interest' defence as
involving a subjective evaluation of the public importance of the expression in issue. All
the same, the court refused to demarcate specific areas where the defence would apply to
override proprietary interests. In doing so, the court was apparently motivated by the
need to maintain as wide an application of the doctrine as possible, instead of introducing
self-imposed limitations.
From one perspective, the court's reluctance to fetter itself with limitations may
be seen as an abandonment of the normative approach. It is however equally arguable
that the court could have reached an identical solution through the normative approach,
applied within the contours of the problem - thereby avoiding the need to identify all
possible situations, which seems to have been the primary concern of the court. If one
however attempts to understand the court's final conclusion in terms of the
interpretation-specification-application process discussed earlier, it is possible to make
the argument that the court did in fact make a normative judgement, albeit a limited one.
It is important, in this analysis not to be influenced by the court's final decision in
upholding the primacy of the proprietary interest; the normative reference area approach
may indeed be used to demarcate areas where proprietary concerns are perceived as more
important than liberty interests.
The court could have reached its decision by applying the interpretation-
specification-application process through one of two means. First, the court could have
identified the normative reference area in terms of the restrictions permitted under the
express language of Article 10 of the ECHR. 152 The indeterminate norm here would
therefore be that limited restrictions on free expression are permissible as may be
necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights of others. In a copyright context,
this norm would read: principally commercially motivated free expression can be
permissibly overridden by the proprietary interests of others in such expressions. The
court could thereafter have concluded that the expression reproduced by the defendant
was commercially motivated and therefore subordinate to the plaintiffs proprietary
claims in the same.
The second approach would have been to identify the normative reference area in
positive terms. The indeterminate norm would read as -public interest dictates that
copyright law is subject to overriding free expression interests and may be overridden by
the same. This would be contextualized further non-deductively (but normatively) to
become - the reproduction of an expression purely to convey the authenticity a news
report would override the property claim that such an expression could be subject to. The
court could then have finally concluded that since the reproduction was for commercial
rather than authenticity purposes, it fell outside the normative reference area where
liberty interests prevailed and therefore amounted to an infringement of the plaintiffs
copyright.
The first approach adopts the normative area in reference to an established
exception, thereby approaching the issue in a purportedly negative sense by giving color
and content to the exception enshrined in the protective norm (i.e., free expression). The
second, in contrast, adopts the opposite approach and categorizes the reference area in
terms of a direct conflict between the two norms - with the ultimate application however
establishing that the normative preference need not actually operate since the overlap is
not called into question.
From a purely normative analysis, it would seem that the first approach is
preferable. Although couched in language favoring the overriding of the liberty interest
by copyright, the first approach recognizes the normative pre-eminence of free expression
(i.e., by taking its normative starting point as the permissible exception) and that
copyright law (if it must remain operational in the event of an overlap) can exist as an
acceptable exception provided its legitimacy is tested against the moral intrinsicalities of
free expression. An approach such as this would arguably place a procedural obstacle to
the uncontrolled expansion of copyright law by requiring a substantive evaluation of its
permissibility vis-A-vis free expression. Note however, that this legitimacy determination
occurs as a non-deductive normative process at the specification stage. In contrast, the
second approach, though producing the same outcome, commences from a position
implying the normative supremacy of copyright law. Even though the ultimate preference
in the determinate version of the norm is for free expression, the normative hierarchy
seems to favor the property interest since the argument is couched in terms of a defence
to infringement, rather than an outer boundary for copyright law.
The argument, therefore, essentially boils down to this - is Section 171(3) to be
interpreted as normatively equivalent to Article 10 of the ECHR or as a defence intrinsic
to copyright law that draws color from Article 10? Though seemingly subtle, the
difference is critical. In the former interpretation, public interest becomes an insuperable
hurdle to copyright law, while in the latter, it is a limited area within copyright law,
where the property interest must perfunctorily accede to the libertarian. To further
extrapolate, however, and speculate on the structural biases of the interpretative process
may prove to be of little value, given the insufficient discussion on the issue in the case.
It is well arguable that the above discussion is of little consequence, given the
court's final decision; more so given the court's express inclination to avoid demarcating
areas where the public interest defense might apply. It is also reasonably justifiable to
allege that the entire discussion thus far has sought to read too much normative
significance into what is no more than a purely doctrinaire interpretation of the provision
or even in the alternative, an intuitive outcome within a given factual paradigm. From
such a perspective, not just the relative merits of each theory, but even the normative
reference area approach is but a conjecture in the context of the instant case and therefore
of little value.
The point may indeed be conceded. Nevertheless such theorization is indeed of
value to highlight the possible structural and doctrinal biases that can operate under the
garb of a normatively neutral interpretative process. Even if inapplicable to the instant
case, it may indeed pave the way for further probing in future property-liberty stand-offs
over expression, specifically in the context of these provisions.
III. COPYRIGHT AS A HUMAN RIGHT
Thus far the conflict between copyright law and free expression has been posited
as a confrontation between proprietary and libertarian interests in expression. There
however does exist a school of thought, which believes that copyright law, is in itself a
form of free expression and therefore a human right in itself. Consequently, the conflict
then, it is argued, is not one of balancing two competing normative interests, but one of
actually demarcating the amplitude of a single normative principle - free expression. This
part examines the legitimacy of such a claim.
The argument that is made in philosophical terms to justify copyright as a form of
free expression is that copyright, allows an author to secure his independence from
patronage and possible influences from state and individuals. It thereby is supposed to
secure the individual freedom of the author, in expressive terms153 and thus represent an
independent libertarian interest. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), considered the bible for
international human rights norms, provides support for the argument that copyright is a
human right. Article 27, therein, guarantees all individuals the right to protection of
"moral and material interests" flowing from works of authorship. 155 If this provision were
indeed a reference to the law of copyright (in its modern expanded form), the argument
for copyright law being a human right would find considerable merit.
The emphasis in the provision would however appear to be on the moral interest
involved in the work - the idea of protecting a personality representation. This has led
scholars to argue that the provision is more a representation of the continental idea of the
droit d'auteur simpliciter than it is of modern copyright law in its expanded amplitude.1
56
If the provision were a mere reference to the deontological moral right element in
copyright law, then there would be little problem, given the very deontological nature of
the human rights discourse. The problem however, is with the use of the word "material"
in conjunction with moral rights. Would the protection of 'material interests' encompass
the tradable proprietary element of modem copyright as well?
Scholarly opinion that the provision only makes reference to the natural right
droit d'auteur element, 157 rather than a purely proprietary claim, has merit in the actual
construction of the provision. The provision uses 'protection' rather than 'property',
emphasizes interests (including material interests) resulting from the production rather
than from a state grant (which is usually the case with intellectual property rights) and
most importantly, accords primacy to the moral element and confines the right to the
author only and not to someone deriving through him. While the apparent focus of
Article 27 is on a droit d'auteur approach, some writers opine that the provision is the
source for all forms of intellectual property law.
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The integration of human rights into discourses on free trade and economic
liberalization, however, is not a recent phenomenon. Some authors try tracing this
argument back to the writings of Immanuel Kant and his observations on the role of
international economic integration as a necessary route to ensuring greater compliance
with human rights norms. 159 These approaches seek to place rights, like the 'freedom of
contract' and the 'right to property', at the center of human rights discourse. Authors
argue that one can effectively exercise other social and civil rights only through these
economic liberties. 160 Additionally, such approaches clearly reflect the real motive behind
this purported merger of the two discourses by their claiming that this would add a
certain moral legitimacy to free trade arguments, thereby indirectly promoting the
enforcement of human rights. 161
Philip Alston, in his scathing critique of such approaches, characterizes them as
representing a form of 'epistemological misappropriation' that fails to recognize the
inherent dichotomy between instrumentalist arguments (which characterize the economic
liberalization debate) and those surrounding human dignity, which form the core of
human rights discourses. 162 This merely represents the deontological-consequentialist
divide existing between the market-driven and dignity-centred approaches discussed
earlier. The Alston-Petersmann debate occurs at the generalized level in the context of
international economic institutions (such as the WTO) and their role in the human rights
discourse, but the reasoning used therein is equally applicable to the specific context of
copyright as an element of the human rights discourse.
A broader, structural critique of this approach, however, essentially derives from
Upendra Baxi's criticism of a modem trend where elite commercial interests always seek
to misappropriate existent normative discourses in seeking to promote the expansion of
global capital - what he terms the "...critical appropriation of the human rights discourse
by global capital. 163" This process essentially involves using normative language to
justify the expansion of the commercial ideology. The normative framework, therefore,
posits itself as a legitimizing factor for the expansion process.164
One can trace back in time, the proposition that all forms of intellectual property
are human rights in themselves. 165 The modem brand of intellectual property, copyright
in specific, however, has none of the characteristic features ordinarily attributed to human
rights. Unlike intrinsic and inalienable human rights, these rights are often state grants,
not recognitions, (i.e., not natural rights) and probably, most importantly, are waivable
and freely marketable. Further, being in the nature of a commercial interest, their
emphasis is distinctively consequence-based, whereas human rights can be characterized
as ethical process rights.
The fallacy inherent in characterizing 'copyright as a human right' is evident not
only from recent trends seeking to commercialize intellectual property as 'trade-related
rights', but even from the arguments advanced for the same. Even in recent initiatives to
expand copyright, the argument is that the expansion is intended to serve the interests of
the author and to promote creativity. It is pertinent to note, however, that the TRIPs
Agreement does not even make mention of the concept of moral rights 166 _ probably the
only remaining deontological component of copyright law - and exclusive to individual
authors. The interests of large commercial entities are therefore projected as those of
individual authors. 167 Thus, Baxi's proposition may prove equally true regarding the
argument that copyright as such is a human right.
One can draw a parallel with Baxi's conceptual analysis of the 'human rights of
corporations', where he observes that recent human rights discourses have begun to
witness the emergence of 'trade-related market friendly human rights' in an attempt to
legitimize the commercial activities of corporations at the cost of other individual
rights. 168 Classifying copyright as a human right would prima facie provide an adequate
justification for its continued expansion, both quantitatively through term extensions
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and through other qualitative means. 170 Terming a commercial interest as a human right
provides the activity with a considerable degree of legitimacy that is then used to thwart
attempts to question the primacy of the commercial interest involved.
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Copyright can never be considered a human right strictu sensu because the
process of commodification is central to the right, unlike deontological human rights.
Under certain circumstances, it is indeed possible that the proprietary interest and liberty
interest in an expression may not conflict - but it is crucial to understand that this hardly
converts one into another. Simply because the subject matter of both interests remains the
same (i.e., expression), the absence of a conflict cannot be taken to mean a coalescence of
values. A proprietary interest will always be concerned with the creation of marketable
value, undoubtedly a possible virtue in itself. Freedom of expression, on the other hand,
is more process oriented. While not always opposed to the creation of marketable value,
one can hardly imply that the process of value creation gets transfigured into a free
expression right. This is for the simple reason that even if the process of value creation in
an expression (which may pass for copyright) is taken as the property right in question, it
remains distinctly teleological and end-oriented, which human rights are not meant to be.
An alternative argument is that instead of locating copyright within the general
human rights discourse, it should be placed within the context of a general
democratization process since copyright is essentially a state measure that uses market
institutions to enhance the democratic character of civil society. 172 As a result, copyright
is supposed to have a dual function - one, the production function of encouraging
political, artistic and cultural expression in society and two, a structural function of
enabling the existence of this expression independent of state or other political
patronage. 1
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Unlike the previous argument that copyright is a form of free expression, this
argument postulates that copyright plays a vital role in encouraging free expression in a
democratic society. An approach such as this is quite commendable, especially when
supplemented by the understanding that copyright's ability to perform this task has in
recent times been waning. This approach seemingly concedes that copyright ultimately is
consequentialist or end-driven. In this approach, generating original expression remains
the end sought by copyright, which coincides with the objective of encouraging free
expression in a democratic society. A commonality of ends is thus achieved, but the
approach remains distinct - copyright encourages expression under the incentive of a
monopoly right; while free expression does so for the abstract fundamentality of such
expression in a democratic society. Thus, copyright encourages expression through the
market, which often results in the market-objective eclipsing the value inherent in the
expression (which a liberty-based interest seeks to place primacy on). This is
distinguishable from the misconception that copyright is deontologically inclined merely
because the end achieved is similar to that postulated by the libertarian value of free
expression. Indeed, in any deontological approach it would appear that there is no distinct
attainable end, since the supremacy of the normative value in question is the abstract and
often elusive goal. Freedom, at the end of the day, was never intended to be a tradable
commodity.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS GREATER NORMATIVE INDEPENDENCE
Solutions that are very often suggested to the normative conflict inherent in
expression come across as either very extreme and impracticable, or as unacceptably
defeatist. The former would include arguments that copyright should be relegated back to
its initial phase of being nothing more than a mere form of a regulatory monopoly. 174 The
latter category would cover arguments that seek to deny the very existence of a conflict
through subtle variations in the doctrines of copyright law or the law of free expression.
At the very outset, it must be recognized that modern copyright law is an attempt to
propertize expression and convert it into a marketable commodity; while the right to free
expression derives from the inherent supremacy of freedom of speech as a value in a
democratic society. It is crucial to bear in mind that this difference in purpose will
dominate either discourse, and cannot be ignored - regardless of ephemeral overlaps. The
element of 'commodification' is therefore decisive in copyright law, as Foucault pointed
out, and is evidence of its modem day proximity to market forces rather than to romantic
deontological conceptions based on an intangible right to personality.
From the previous illustrations it is seen that innumerable attempts have been
made to create a balance for the coexistence of both the proprietary and liberty interests
in expression. An important factor that is often ignored in attempts to balance the two
values is that the manner in which the discourse is structured is often determinative of the
final outcome. If the discourse is structured as one of copyright law and the need for an
independent free expression defense to infringement - then the discourse will
automatically revolve around how copyright law can accommodate free expression. On
the other hand if the discourse is one of the right to free expression and the question of
how copyright may be a restriction (reasonable/unreasonable) on the same, the pivotal
element will remain free expression. Most judicial and legislative approaches on the issue
have tended to adopt one of these methodologies (generally, the former) and have thereby
adopted an a priori assumption of superiority amongst the normative values. Thus, for
instance the attempt to try and formulate a 'first amendment defense' does implicitly
recognize that a priori copyright interests dominate but that a small area should be carved
out for free expression interests. The converse is equally true.
Apart from this, these approaches also suffer from a perceivable lack of
consistency, occasionally coming across as ad hoc attempts to deal with the issue. They
also seem to evince a distinct end-driven approach, which realists would categorize as
forms of post-decisional rationalization. The sequitur of such approaches is that neither
normative value is able to derive its legitimacy independent of the other.
Courts and policy makers must understand that allowing a true balance will
necessitate according precedence to one normative value over the other, in specific
situations. Decision makers must recognize copyright law and free expression as
competing norms within a narrow framework and that in the event of a conflict between
the two, one of the normative values will have to prevail at the cost of the other. An
attempt must be made to recognize specific circumstances and situations where one value
is more desirable than the other - and ought to accordingly prevail in the event of a
conflict. These may be circumstances where public policy may necessitate allowing
copyright to prevail over free expression given the realities of the global information
market; and there may be yet others where the democratic value of free expression will
be considered unimpeachably supreme. However, what is necessary is a clear
identification of such circumstances coupled with a readiness to adopt a normative
hierarchy for each situation. Such a process may yet provide the only solution to
achieving a true balance that allows each normative value to realize itself independent of
the other.
The normative reference area approach drawn from the constitutional
interpretation (interpretation-specification-application) process provides one
methodological approach allowing a normative preference within a recognized context.
In this process, the real normative determination is made at the specification stage where
the norm is transformed from its indeterminate state into a determinate and
contextualized form through a non-deductive process. The process of adding determinacy
to the norm plays a significant role in determining the outcome. As is the case with most
issues in the interpretative process, it is unlikely that courts will ever adopt such an
approach in overt and express terms and the best that can be hoped is that
methodologically this approach can be derived from judicial reasoning. As long as one
recognizes the move from the broad, generalized norm to its specific application as
requiring a preliminary normative contextualization (the specification process), the
methodological pattern is put into place. It is only when courts argue that no real
normative judgment is involved that one again falls back into a spiral of normative
dependence all over again.
The argument that copyright is a human right reflects this normative inter-
dependence and must be approached with considerable caution. Very often the argument
is used as a masquerade to avoid a selection of normative values or worse still, as part of
an inevitability argument, where the preponderance of market forces dictates the content
of the human rights discourse. Modern copyright law is clearly market driven and
consequentialist. The deontological element is essentially diluted, if not already absent.
Attempting to include such a right within the human rights discourse will have the effect
of devaluing the deontological approach, considered critical to the human rights
discourse.
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the reality that copyright law and its continuing
expansion in light of recent technological developments, though dictated primarily by
market considerations, are here to stay. Failing to recognize this will result in discussions
occurring in idealistic realms, oblivious to international developments dictated by the
forces of economic globalization. Existent discourses on the conflict remain structurally
biased in favour of copyright expansion, driven by market consequentialism. While this is
per se unproblematic, the failure to recognize the inherent normative hierarchy that this
relies on, not only renders nugatory the theoretical supremacy of free expression but also
restrains copyright from realizing its objectives, often entangling it in superficial
philosophical theories that dilute its essential structure and function. To reverse the trend
of copyright expansion may prove to be illusory, unless the structural bias in existent
discourses is both recognized and reversed - a seemingly impracticable alternative. The
least expected, however, is the readiness to accept the normative hierarchy idea and the
fact that this hierarchy is indeed capable of reversing itself in specifically identified
situations to suit identifiable public policy objectives. Unless this is achieved, it may only
be a matter of time before free expression becomes infused within the doctrines of
copyright law, with neither being able to achieve its doctrinal purpose completely.
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